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PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHac

MINOITIES BEFORE

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mustafa Aijazuddin t
I.

Introduction

International law is a body of rules established by custom or treaty and recognized by nations as binding in their relations with one another. International law
"governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon
States therefore emanate from their own free will." 2

Customs are traditionally a major source of international law. Societies, individually, develop customs as a method to maintain order in society. 3 These customs, having developed into rules, are maintained frequently through "means of
social pressure." 4 However, on an international level, Brigit Schhitter believes
that "customs, together with treaties, is the most or second most important source
of legal norms. This is commonly credited to the fact that the international legal
order lacks a formal legislature or other centralized governmental organ." 5
As such, for a custom to become international law, otherwise known as Customary International Law, there must exist: (1) evidence of State practice; and (2)
opinio juris.6 This means that for acts, social norms, or other implied social convention to be considered Customary International Law, the custom must amount
to a settled practice, and must also "be carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it." Furthermore, State practice only contributes to forming
Customary International Law when the State practice is consistent, widespread,
and is shown to exist in an array of different legal systems. 8
I B.A., 20th Century European Geopolitics, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2016. J.D., The John
Marshall Law School, 2019. Special thanks to Stuart Ford and William B.T. Mock for their support
throughout the writing process.
2 SS "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 18 (Sept. 7 1927).
3 62 BIRGIT SCHLOUTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL AD HOC CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 10 (2010).
4

Id. (citing MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (5th ed. 2003).

5

Id.

6 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶1(b).

7 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶77 (Feb. 20, 1969).
8 Statute of the International Court of Justice, ); see also supra note 5; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2), § 102(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1987) (stating that "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states" and further explaining that "practice of states" includes such things as "diplomatic acts and instructions . .. other governmental acts and official statements of policy"); see also WILLIAM MOCK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Carolina Academic Press) (forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 4, 5) ("To contribute
to the formation of CIL, state practice must be consistent, widespread, and shown to exist in sources from
a variety of different countries (both geographically and politically). Furthermore, the relevant state ac-
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This paper reviews the existence of a custom, or norm, in international law
that prohibits State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of religious and
ethnic minorities. It does so by reviewing six treaties, one of which is a collection
of treaties known as the Minority Treaties, and the actions of the ad hoc tribunal
established to determine the guilt of Peter von Hagenbach on charges of wartime
atrocities. The treaties analyzed are: The Concordat of Worms, 1122; the Edict of
Nantes, 1598; the Peace of Westphalia, 1648; the Treaty of Ki9ik Kaynarca,
1774; the Treaty of Berlin, 1878; and the Minority Treaties. In doing so, this
paper determines that there may have in fact existed ample support for the existence of such a norm.
The Concordat of Worms helps develop a norm by laying the groundwork for
a State's intervention and prevention in other States. The Concordat is unrelated
to a norm protecting ethnic or religious minorities; instead it brokered the respective sovereign powers between the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church.
However, this is where the norm starts to develop; the norm that eventually becomes a norm against State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of
minorities.
Next, the trial of Peter von Hagenbach is also an essential step that helps
develop the above-mentioned norm. With the Concordat starting to create a norm
that allows a sovereign to interfere with the affairs of another sovereign, especially in the governance of a country, the trial of Peter von Hagenbach takes this
norm one step further. The trial created a recognition amongst sovereign States
that some actions are so egregious as to warrant international intervention.
The Edict of Nantes supplements the norm against a State committing sanctioned mass murder of people, specifically a Huguenot minority, by taking decisive steps to extend and start develop an explicit right of a State to protect
minorities inside and outside of its political borders, and by creating an external
obligation on other States to prohibit the same conduct.
Similarly, the Peace of Westphalia ("the Peace") provides strong evidence of
the signatories' intent to extend the Peace to include protections for religious
minorities, in and outside of their own territories. It supplemented a norm that
had begun to form; wherein States were entrusted to protect not only their homogenous citizens, but also people who held different religions, creeds, and ethnic backgrounds.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Kui9uik Kaynarca ("The Treaty") is another example of where States acted to ensure the protection of religious minorities. The
Treaty was intended to protect Orthodox Christians traveling through and residing in the Ottoman Empire from State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or other
forms of oppression. It further supplemented a growing norm of protecting religious and ethnic minorities within the political territory of a different State by
granting a right of intervention if a State failed to adhere to the tenants of the
treaty or their obligation to protect said minorities under the treaty.
tions must be such that they arose out of a sense of legal obligation, not simply habit or national selfinterest.").
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Also, the Treaty of Berlin was intended, in part, to protect religious minorities
in the newly recognized Balkan States after the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78.
The intent of the treaty was to create protection and a condition precedent to
officially recognizing these Balkan States. These States had to agree to legally
protect religious minorities before they would, or could, be officially recognized.
The last set of treaties that will be probed are collectively known as the Minority Treaties. These treaties required States to take steps to protect ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities by prescribing that these people were to be viewed
equally under the law and have the free exercise of their religion, language, and
culture in their homes and societies. These treaties are a culmination of international protections against State-sponsored mass murder, harm, or oppression and
expressly lay out the intent of nations to actively and effectively protect religious
and ethnic minorities.
In determining the existence of this norm, all of the evidence provided has to
fall within the criteria of customary international law, i.e. State practice and
opinio juris. By reviewing the evidence in light of these criteria, there seems to
exist a norm that prohibits States from engaging in state-sanctioned mass murder,
harm, or oppression of ethnic and religious minorities. These treaties are the
clearest form of evidence that exist, and they expressly represent the intent and
understanding of each State involved in the treaty. They go to show observers,
more accurately, other States, that the contracting parties believe that a norm
exists which the contracting parties are bound to. The treaties show a statement
of a norm through a wide period of time, 1474 to 1923. The treaties and trial span
centuries, a multitude of different ethnic backgrounds and religions. Furthermore,
States moved to include language and clauses in these treaties to protect ethnic
and religious minorities and prohibit States from attempting to harm them in any
form. This shows that these parties were aware that there, at the very least, may
exist a norm that requires the protection of minorities. The evidence supports this
because the treaties were the attempts of the States to ensure compliance with an
existing norm.
II. Customary International Law: How the Progression of Law as
Applied Creates Precedent for Preventing State-Sanctioned Atrocities
To be considered Customary International Law, there must exist evidence of:
(1) State practice; and (2) opinio juris.9 Customary International Law is "interna10
This means
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
that for acts, social norms, or other implied social conventions to be considered
Customary International Law, it must amount to a settled practice, and "must also
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.""
However, there is currently no consensus as to "how long a rule must be in
9 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6.
10 Id.

" North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 at
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existence, the number of nations that must endorse it, whether the endorsement
must take the form of actions or simply statements of support, or whether the
endorsement must be made out of a sense of legal obligation or simply given as
an expression of policy preference." 12
A.

State Practice

.

To form Customary International Law ("CL"), there must exist evidence of
State practice, or "general practice." 13 To determine State practice, it is beneficial
to look at what States do in their relations with one another. State practice is
about considering how States interact with one another and how they treat each
other, geopolitically. Accordingly, general practice indicates that there must be a
showing of a "common and widespread practice among States" in order for there
to be a finding of CIL.14 However, State practice does not need to be universally
recognized or implemented; it can also be a representation of major political and
economic systems that help create one custom. 15
Under State practice, factors may be also used to help determine the extent of
"common and widespread." According to Manley 0. Hudson, a Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, State practice can be determined
when there is evidence of the following factors:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing
international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.' 6
Courts have considered different sources that may establish evidence of CL.
These sources include: treaties, judgments and opinions of international or national judicial tribunals, national legislation, diplomatic correspondences, and
general declaration of foreign policies.' 7 Mark Villiger' 8 argues that comments
made, under official capacity, may constitute evidence of State practice as well.
He claims that "[i]n the Nicaragua Case, the court had no hesitation to rely on
statements made at diplomatic conferences" as evidence constituting State practice.19 He claims that the court "referred to other written texts, for instance . .
12 Jon Kyl, Douglas J. Feith & John Fonte, The War of Law: How New InternationalLaw Undermines Democratic Sovreignty, FOREIGN AFFAIRS July/Aug. 2013, at 125.

13 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6.
14 28 MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATTEs: A MANUAL ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 29 (fully rev. 2d ed. 1997).

15 Id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at ¶73. . .).
16 Manley Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute of the InternationalLaw Commission, (1950) 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16.
17 VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 17.

18 Mark Villiger is a former judge of the European Court of Human Rights (2006-2015).
19 VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 20.
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'

constitutions of international organizations, and treaties, when establishing the
customary nature of norms." 20
As such, one of the earliest examples of CL being applied, in any court, is
The Paquete Habana case heard in front of the United States Supreme Court in
1900.21 During the Spanish-American War, the American navy seized a Spanish
fishing vessel off the coast of Cuba. 22 The United States government then sold
everything on the boat as well as the boat itself. 2 3 The court, attempted to determine, whether under international law, coastal fishing vessels peacefully engaged
in catching and transporting fish were exempt from capture as a prize of war. 2 4
The court analyzed obligations that may exist under international law that prohibited coastal fishing vessels, including their equipment, supplies, cargoes, and
crews, which are unarmed and honestly pursuing their trade of catching and
transporting fish, from capture as a prize of war. 2 5 There are a number of instances that the court cites where coastal fishing vessels engaged in commercial
fishing, along with their cargoes and crews, were recognized as protected from
capture as prizes of war. 2 6 King Henry IV of England, in 1403 and 1406, ordered
the protection of fishermen from France, Flanders, and Brittany from capture by
British soldiers, only in so far as the boats were engaging in fishing activities. 2 7
France reciprocated this practice. 28 Furthermore, both the United States and
Great Britain recognized a similar practice during the Revolutionary War in
1776.29 During that war, soldiers were ordered not to disturb fishermen from both
sides as long as their vessels were full of fresh fish, did not contain offensive
weapons or signs of providing aid to the enemy. 30 Similarly, in 1785, the United
States and Prussia signed a treaty that provided that if war should arise between
the two countries, all unarmed fishermen would be allowed to continue their
employment uninterrupted. 3
Historically, the only exception to this general protection for fishermen occurred due to the United States' suspicion of French and English fishermen during the French Revolution in 1789.32 However, the United States again
3
recognized this protection during the 1846 wars with Mexico.3

.

20 Id. (emphasis added.
21 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678 (1900).
22 Id. at 678.
23 Id. at 679.
24 Id. at 696.
25 Id.
26

Id. at 687-88.

27
28

Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.

29

Id. at 689.

30 Id. at

690-1.

31 Id.
32

Id. at 692.

33

Id. at 696-7.
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This same protection is also recognized in international law, and is discussed
by French, Argentine, German, Dutch, English, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese,
and Italian writers on international law. 3 4 The wealth of information written
about the subject by multiple nations suggests that it is an established rule of
international law that coastal fishing vessels, including their equipment, supplies,
cargoes, and crews, which are unarmed and honestly pursuing their trade of
catching and transporting fish, are exempt from capture as a prize of war.
The Paquete Habana court determined that there existed ample evidence of
widespread State practice prohibiting States from seizing fishing boats off the
coast of a country, including Cuba. There was no sign that the Paquete Habana
and the other fishing boat in question were not peacefully pursuing their normal
fishing trade off the coast of Cuba, and thus they are protected from capture by
the United States, as a prize of war.
Another example of international law is treaties. Treaties are, as defined by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"), international
agreements that are concluded between different States, bilaterally or multilaterally, in written form and governed by international law.3 5 Treaties can also be
laid out as a single instrument or in multiple related instruments and still be
binding as a single treaty. 3 6 This article discusses treaties and the formation of
customary international law through treaties in more detail below, under Section
B - Opinio Juris.
This paper heavily considers treaties and the decisions of an ad hoc international judicial tribunal to establish evidence of State practice. Treaties, it has been
claimed, are applicable examples of State practice.3 7 Villiger claims that "when
the customary rule has eventually developed, the written text may reflect, or provide evidence of the customary rule."3 8 The following treaties provide evidence
of State practice that may have helped to form a custom against nations engaging
in State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of religious and ethnic minorities within a State's own territory: The Concordat of Worms, 1122; the Trial
of Peter von Hagenbach; the Edict of Nantes, 1598; the Peace of Westphalia,
1648; the Treaty of Ktigik Kaynarca, 1774; the Treaty of Berlin, 1878. It will
also briefly review, collectively, the Little Treaty of Versailles; the AustrianCzech-Yugoslav Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye (1919); the Romanian Treaty of
Paris (1919), the Greek Treaty of S6vres (1920); the Hungarian Treaty of Trianon
(1920), the Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (1919), and the Turkish Treaty
of Lausanne (1923).39
34 Id. at 694-707.
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
36 Id.
37 VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 26.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Paris Peace Conferece, 1919, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.newworldencyclopedia
.org/entry/Paris Peace Conference,_ 1919 (mentions what is collectively known as the Twentieth Century's Minority Treaties).
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i.

Concordat of Worms, 1122

The Concordat of Worms, signed in 1122, was one of the first instances of a
written accord that impliedly allowed sovereign States to exert control over the
subjects of another State. 40 The Concordat granted the Papal States, specifically
the Pope, a secondary authority to appoint and/or approve the appointment of
clerics, including but not limited to bishops and abbots, in the lands of each
Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. 4 1
Prior to 1122, and the Concordat of Worms, a struggle existed concerning the
spiritual and corporal authority over people. 42 The Catholic Church attempted to
exert influence over the citizens of other sovereign States claiming that as the
spiritual authority of all people, the Church was superior to any earthly authority, 4 3 thus, superseding the authority of kings and emperors. This struggle eventually led to the Concordat of Worms, where the Papal States and the Holy Roman
Empire came to an agreement over two concurrent spheres of influences."4
The Concordat expressly addresses the privileges and obligations of the Papal
States under Pope Callixtus II.45 The Concordat of Worms claims, as to these
privileges and obligations, that the States agrees to:
... grant to thee beloved son, Henry . . . the elections of the bishops and
abbots of the German kingdom, who belong to the kingdom, shall take
place in thy presence . .. The one elected, moreover, without any exaction
may receive the regalia from thee through the lance, and shall do unto
thee for these what he rightfully should. But he who is consecrated in the
other parts of thy empire 46 shall . . . receive the regalia from thee through
the lance, and shall do unto thee for these what he rightfully should. Excepting all things which are known to belong to the Roman church . . .47
As a consequence of the Concordat, two political authorities were created
within Germany that existed concurrently. The first was the right of the king, or
emperor, to appoint a bishop or abbot with secular authority, "the lance," within
his own domain. The Concordat expressly required the Papal States to recognize
this authority. The Papal obligations required "the [bishop] elected, moreover,
without any exaction" to "receive the regalia from [the emperor] through the
40 Documents Relating to the War of the Investitures Concordat of Worms; September 23, 1122, THE
AVALON PROJECT DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HisToRY, AND DIPLOMACY (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/

medieval/invl6.asp (hereinafter Concordat of Worms).
41 Medieval Sourcebook: The Concordatof Worms 1122, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (Jan. 1996), https://
sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/worms 1.asp.
42 Samuel W. Bettwy, United States - Vatican Recognition: Backgroundand Issues, 29, THE CATHOLIc LAWYER 225, 229 (2017).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Concordat of Worms, supra note 40.
46 Id. (here, the Concordat of Worms, is intentionally silent as to the other kingdoms, principalities,
dukedoms, comte, margraviates, bishoprics, abbacy, etc., that fell outside of the political borders of the
German Kingdom.).
47 Id.
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lance." 48 Meaning, the Papacy could no longer appoint a cleric without the consent of the emperor. Furthermore, the State created an obligation for itself when
it confirmed the emperor's feudal rights by asserting that the emperor "shall do
unto thee for these what he rightfully should." 49 The king, then, was invested
with every feudal right and privilege that came with being the sovereign lord of
these clerics. He was able to levy military support, have the bishop conduct administrative duties for the empire, and other tasks that were required by the emperor to effectively operate the empire. The Papal States, thus, were forbidden
from interacting with clerics in any political capacity.
However, the Concordat of Worms granted the Papal States the privilege to
appoint bishops and other clerics in territories that fell squarely outside of the
Kingdom of Germany. This privilege had not existed, on such a widespread
scale, prior to the Concordat. The Concordat expressly asserts that the right of the
king, or emperor, to appoint bishops only extends within the borders of the Kingdom of Germany. It states, "the elections of the bishops and abbots of the German kingdom, who belong to the kingdom," 50 but intentionally excludes any
mention of the other kingdoms, principalities, and other feudal realms. The result
of this exclusion was that the Pope was able to exert significant influence within
the Holy Roman Empire without violating the Concordat.
The Concordat of Worms was one of the first instances that a sovereign State
was able to exert influence and control over another State. The Papal States were
able to exert influence over the Holy Roman Empire and ensure that the emperor
adhered to Papal will. The Concordat resulted in bishops owing their allegiance
in worldly matters both to the Pope and to the king because it gave secular authority, "by the lance," to the Holy Roman Emperor, but it allowed the Pope, as
the head of the Papal State, to exert influence, through ensuring that the spiritual
integrity was superior to corporal authority.
Thus, the Concordat helped to develop a norm where one State is able to
influence the actions of another. This norm eventually grew into States creating a
prohibition on other States from engaging in State-sanctioned mass murder,
harm, or oppression of religious and ethnic minorities within a State's own borders. The Concordat of Worms was merely the first step in this developing norm.
ii.

The Trial of Peter von Hagenbach, 1474

The trial of Sir Peter von Hagenbach was one of the first instances of when
Nation-States came together to place offending States on notice that actions committed against people, both citizens and non-citizens, were violations of an established norm.51 The decision rendered by that court was vital to the development
of the norm prohibiting States from engaging in State-sanctioned mass murder of
civilians. This ad hoc tribunal determined that von Hagenbach had "trampled
Id.
Id.
50 Id.
51 Gregory S. Gordon, The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach: Reconciling History, Historiography,and
International Criminal Law (2012), https://ssm.com/abstract=2006370.
48

49
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under foot the laws of God and man." 52 Through these actions, the court created
an implied norm that placed commanders and other sovereigns on notice that
they may be under an international obligation to abstain from raping, sacking,
and killing people.5 3
Peter von Hagenbach was a commander in the service of Charles the Bold,
Duke of Burgundy, in 1474.5 4He was given the status of governor of Alsace by
Charles and tasked with maintaining Charles' authority in his recently acquired
holdings from the Archduke of Austria, Sigismund von Habsburg.5 5 Though the
reason for the cities', specifically Breisach's, rebellion is unknown, Professor
Cherif Bassiouni believed that Breisach rebelled because of the Duke's
"[u]ninterest in the fate of the distant German townspeople," and that "[he] ordered Peter to collect massive exactions" of taxes. 56 He levied heavy taxes and
controlled his new possessions hard-handedly; territories who, up until then, had
been subjects of an absentee monarch in distant Austria. Charles sent von
Hagenbach to Breisach to enforce his will and von Hagenbach used that position
to "murder, rape, pillage, [and] wonton[ly] confiscate" people's property.5 7 Von
Hagenbach brutalized the Alsatians under Burgundy's control when there was no
war nor an external conflict. He controlled Charles' Alsatian territory as if Bur58
gundy was occupying Alsace under military occupation during a war.

When he was finally captured, von Hagenbach was arrested by Freidrich Kappelar, a citizen of Breisach, and held to await the judgment of Sigismund, Archduke of Austria. Sigismund, however, made an unprecedented decision for his
time, and ordered a trial be to convened to have von Hagenbach answer for the
raping, pillaging, and murders committed by him and his troops; a trial that
would be tried by twenty-eight representatives of the surrounding sovereign
States. 59 He was eventually charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder
52 Id. at 177 n. 2127 (citing Jules Deschenes, Toward International Criminal Justice, in ROGER S.
CLARK & MADELEINE SANN, THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 30 (2003)).

53 Id. at 7-9.

54 Sources differ on whether von Hagenbach was a condottiere hired by the Duke to specifically
enforce the Duke's authority in the Alsace, including the city of Breisach, or whether he was already in
service of the Duke at the time that he committed the charged crimes. Id. at 17 n. 21, citing M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 298 (2010).
55 Many sources differ on how and why Charles the Bold acquired these territories, including the city
of Breisach. However, a majority claim that Charles acquired these holding because the Archduke of
Austria found himself on the brink of financial ruin and could not pay the Swiss or maintain control over
his possession in the Upper Rhine. Thus, he mortgaged his Rhinish holdings on both sides of the of the
Rhine, including: The Landgraviate of Alsace, the counties of Ferrette and Hauenstein, the towns of
Breisach, Ortenburg, Rheinfelden, Seckingen, Lauffenburg, and Waldshut. Sigismund, out of this arrangement, received 50,000 Rhenish florins and a promise from Charles that he would pay the Swiss
reparations in the sum of an additional 10,000 Rhenish florins. RICHARD VAUGHAN, CHARLES THE BOLD:
THE LAST VALOIS DUKE OF BURGUNDY 84, 85-89 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press 2002).

56 Bassiouni, supra note 53 at 298.
57 Gordon, supra note 51, at 7.
58 Id.

59 Sigismund ordered such a trial because of von Hagenbach's station as a governor and representative of the Duke of Burgundy. These States included the cities of Breisach, Strasbourg, S61estat, Colmar,
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to exterminate the citizens of Breisach, perjury, and rape of numerous women
and girls, including nuns. 6 0
During von Hagenbach's trial, the prosecutor argued that von Hagenbach had
"trampled under foot the laws of God and man," when he decided to rape, murder, and pillage the people he was sent to govern. 61 The prosecutor claimed that
von Hagenbach's actions, as a representative of the Duke, violated the "the privilege he swore to protect when taking his oath of office" 6 2 and that his actions
went against "God, [and] justice."6 3 Kelly Dawn Askin argued that rape is an
instance where "customary norms of warfare . . . considered [rape] a serious
violation and commanders could be held personally responsible for failing to halt
these crimes."" Even then, rape had been considered a crime and was held to be
punishable for anyone who would violate it, including the nobility.6 5
As a result of these actions, the international community interceded to bring an
end to von Hagenbach's reign. Austria, along with the 28 other States, tried von
Hagenbach for his crimes because they recognized that some actions, like rape,
that were so egregious that warranted international intervention from other
States. The trial of Peter von Hagenbach served to advance a developing norm
where States intervened to protect ethnic and religious minorities when other
States engaged in actions so egregious as to warrant international intervention.
iii.

The Edict of Nantes, 1598

The Edict of Nantes further supplemented the norm against State-sanctioned
mass murder of people, specifically minorities. 6 6 The Edict was the culmination
of the preceding events, the Concordat of Worms and the 1474 trial of Peter von
Hagenbach, that helped shape the foundation of a developing norm. The Concordat of Worms allowed a sovereign of an independent nation to exert powerful
political influence within the territories of another State. 6 7 Similarly, the trial of
Peter von Hagenbach gave rise to States acknowledging that a prohibition against
Basel, Thann, Kenzingen, Neuburg am Rhein, Freiburg im Breisgau, Berne, as a member of the Swiss
Confederation, and Solothurn, an ally of Berne. Id. at 30.
60 VAUGHAN, supra note 55, at 285; see JOHN FOSTER KIRK, HISTORY OF CHARLES THE BoLo, DUKE
OP BURGUNDY 411 (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott & Co. 1864); see also GABRIELLH CLEAR-STAMM,
PIERRE DE HAGENBACH: LE DEsTN TRAGIQUE D'UN CHEVALIER SUNDGAUVIEN AU SERVICE DE CHARLES

iE TEMERAIRE 11 (Socit6 d'Histoire du Sundgau 2004).

61 Gordon, supra note 51, at 31-32.
62 Id. at 44.

63 Id. ("Also, he had overwhelmed by force and against their will many married women, maidens,
even nuns in the state of Brisacensis and had done the same things against God, justice, and all honesty
not only there, but also in many other towns and villages").
64 Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in InternationalWar Crimes Tribunals 5, 28-29 (M. NuIHoFF PUBLISHERS 1997).

65 Jordan J. Paust, ISLA Panel Oct. 18, 2003, At Loyola University New Orleans-PanelOn History Of
InternationalTribunals Prior To Nuremberg: Selective History Of International Tribunals And Efforts

PriorTo Nuremberg, 10, ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, 207, 207-213 (2003).
66 HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF AMERICA, Tercentenary Celebration of the Promulgation of the Edict of

Nantes, APRIL 13 ARTICLE 52 (New York: The Huguenot society of America, 1900).
67 See Section 1 of this paper.
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certain conduct, like rape, had "been considered a . . . crime for centuries, and

punishable as such;" thus, acknowledging that some actions warrant international
intervention.6 8 Following these defining moments, the Edict of Nantes then took
the first decisive step to extend and start developing an explicit right of a State to
protect a religious, ethnic, or racial minority. 69
The Kingdom of France, prior to the passage of the Edict of Nantes, found
itself in the grasps of the Wars of Religion. 70 France had been ravaged by internal religious conflicts between the dominant Catholic and young Protestants
Huguenots 7 1 However, Huguenots were more than just Protestants; they were
Protestants of French descent who followed the Reformed tradition.7 2 This identity eventually allowed them to become an ethno-religious group that predominantly operated in France and surrounding territories, such as the Kingdom of
Navarre. However, this ethno-religious group faced severe political backlash
from French Catholic leaders moved quickly brand this new group as heretics
and a "religion of rebels".7 3 As result, France was thrown into chaos because of
this religious disunity.
The Edict, for the most part, granted the Huguenots substantial rights that had
been reserved for Catholics at the time. In the edict, Henry IV de Bourbon aimed
to promote civil unity by separating it from religious unity. Hence, the Edict
granted the Huguenots a new right in the form of an international level of protection that had not been seen before. The Edict asserted:
His Majesty will write to his ambassadors to solicit for all his subjects,
even for the said pretended Reformed religion, that they may not be
68 Gordon, supra note 51, at 8 (quoting Thom Shanker, Sexual Violence, in Roy GUTMAN, DAVID
RIEFF, & ANTHONY

DwORKIN, CRIMEs or WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNow 323 (2d ed. New

York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2007)).
69 It is worth noting that the Edict of Nantes, 1598, does not in any express language states France's
actual ability to enforce the Edict outside of its own territories. HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF AMERICA, supra
note 66 at 52-105 for a complete translation of the Edict, accompanying documents, and a discussion on
the Edict's scope.
70 The Wars of Religions were internal conflicts within France that dated from 1562-1598.
71 Ethnoreligious is identified as people whose religion and ethnicity are intertwined. In the first case,
termed "ethnic fusion," "religion is the foundation of ethnicity, or, ethnicity equals religion, such as in
the case of the Amish and Jews." Yang Fenggang and Helen Rose Ebaugh, Religion and Ethnicity among
New Immigrants: The Impact of Majority/MinorityStatus in Home and Host Countries, J. FOR THE SCI.
STUDY OF RELIG., Vol. 40, No. 3 367-78, 369 (2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1388093. As such, the
Huguenots were protestants of French descent whose religion was the basis of their identity; to be Huguenot was to be French and Protestant. There is no way to differentiate a Huguenot's identity separately.
72 The Reformed tradition is also known as Calvinism, a religious subsect of Protestantism that follows the teachings of Jehan Cauvin, also known as John Calvin. Daniel Peterson, The ProtestantReformation's other great writer, Deseret News, September 17, 2017, https://www.telegram.com/news/
20170917/protestant-reformations-other-great-writer.
73 The history of the Huguenots in France is much more complicated than this statement purports it to
be. However, this historical component does not lead into an understanding of how the Edicts of Nantes,
1598, ensured protections of this new ethnoreligious minority. As a synopsis: Francis I of France attempted to navigate a middle path when he was confronted with Catholic resistance to the arrival and
promulgation of the Protestant faith in the form of Calvinism, Lutheranism, etc. However, after the Affair
of the Placards - a series of events, starting in 1534, where Protestant extremists began pinning up antiCatholic posters including the bedroom door of the French King - Francis began taking a hard-line
stance on the political dissidence of the Protestant faith.
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forced to do anything against their conscience, nor be subject to the Inquisition, going, coming, travelling and trading in foreign countries, the allies and confederates of this Crown, provided, always, that they do not
offend against the laws of the country in which they may be. 74 (Emphasis
added)
Looking at Article 53 shallowly, it seems that Henry created an international
right of protection for all subjects of the kingdom while traveling abroad or conducting business in foreign countries. It states, "they may not be forced to do
anything against their conscience nor be subject to the Inquisition, going, coming, travelling and trading in foreign countries." 7 5 The Article, thus, conferred to
the sovereign the authority to protect minorities, in this specific case, the Huguenots, from being mistreated, seized, charged, tried, murdered, raped, or harmed in
any way. Because Protestants are a minority in France, the Article was Henry's
attempt to exercise his authority outside of France's borders to protect Protestants, while abroad, from any problems they may face from other Catholic nations or the Catholic Church.
However, looking at Article 53 on a deeper level, it conferred to the king the
authority to deny another State from engaging in activities that would been seen
as detrimental to the Huguenots, and seek remedies. The Article, theoretically,
gave the king an implied right to seek remedies against an offending State that
detrimentally harmed the Huguenots. As a consequence, the authority of the Papal States, and the Pope, was curbed by the Edict because it prevented the Pope,
and his inquisitors, from harming Huguenots both inside and outside of France.
The shift that occurred from the Concordat of Worms to here was the king now
exerted political power and influence externally to every State that was an "all[y]
and confederat[e]" of France, whereas the Concordat targeted one specific
State. 7 6
Thus, the Edict of Nantes supplemented the norm against a State, or another
State, committing sanctioned mass murder of people, specifically a Huguenot
minority, by taking decisive steps to extend and develop an explicit right of a
State to protect minorities inside and outside of its political borders, and by creating an external obligation on other States to prohibit the same conduct.
74 ANN MAURY, MEMOIRS OF A HUGENOT FAMILY: TRANSLATED AND COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE REv. JAMES FONTAINE, 492, (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, New Ed.,

(1872) 1658, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgilpt?id=hvd.32044020052973;view= I up;seq= 12. Furthermore,
different translations sometimes have different specific phrasings for Article 58. The Huguenot Society
of America in 1900 released a book titled Tercentenary Celebration of the Promulgationof the Edict of
Nantes, translated the Edict slightly differently; they instead translated it as:
His Majesty will write to his ambassadors to see to it, in respect to all subjects, and especially to
the said, so-called Reformed religion, that they shall not be molested for matters of conscience,
nor be subject to the Inquisition, going, coming, sojourning, negotiating, trafficking in all foreign
countries in alliance and confederates with this crown, provided that they give no offense to the
police of the countries where they may be.
HUGUENOT SOCIETFY OF AMERICA, supra note 66, at 103-04.
75 Id.
76
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iv.

Peace of Westphalia, 1648

The Peace of Westphalia was another instance in which influential States convened together to recognize and prescribe inherent rights, more importantly, protections guaranteed to religious minorities in Europe. Besides being the
progeniture of the modem system and concept of State sovereignty, the Peace of
Westphalia was also a treaty that ended two concurrent wars of religion that were
being fought in Europe during the late 16th century and early 17th century, the
wars were the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War.
The Thirty Years' War was fought between Protestant powers, such as Sweden, Denmark, the Dutch Republic, and many minor Holy Roman Principalities,
who allied themselves with France,77 and Catholic powers, such as the Habsburgs and their allies. The Eighty Years' war was fought between Catholic
Spain and the Protestant Dutch Republic, ending when Spain formally recognized Dutch independence. Thus, the Peace was signed between May and Octo78
ber of 1648 in the cities of Mtinster and Osnabrick.
The Peace of Westphalia was designed, in part, to end the religious violence in
Europe by guaranteeing some level of protection for religions minorities in different States. The Peace asserts:
... all others of the said Confession of Augsburg, 7 9 who shall demand it,
shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in public Churches
at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others
chosen for this purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their
Neighbours, preaching the Word of God.80
Thus, Article 28 allowed people from any State the freedom of religion by
guaranteeing the "free[ ] Exercise of their Religion."8 1 The Peace, however,
leaves out the scope to which this freedom of religion applies; it does not discuss
where or to whom this freedom applies, and who must actively ensure the protection of this undiluted right. The Peace does acknowledge that members of relig77 Id. (explaining that the French involvement in the Thirty Years' War was much more complex.
France, in the 17th century, was a Catholic nation. However, its involvement with the War was not in an
effort to promote the interest of Catholicism. France's involvement, on the side of the Protestant powers,
was, instead, its efforts to fight against the growing, vast power of the Habsburgs. France, in the 17th
century, had been flanked by Habsburgs, as the Kings of Spain and the Emperors of the Holy Roman
Empire. This disadvantageous position is partially what led the French to supporting the Protestants
during the Thirty Years' War.).
78 The Peace of Westphalia, LUMENLEARNING,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hcccworldhistory/chapter/the-peace-of-westphalia/ (last visited Feb. 04, 2020).
79 How did the Peace of Augsburg (1555) lead to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648)?, DailyHistory.org (Oct. 28, 2019), https://dailyhistory.org/HowdidthePeaceofAugsburg_(1555)lead
to the Thirty YearsWar_(1618-1648)%3F (criticizing the Peace for directing different states to recognize the religion of the prince and treat that as the de facto religion of the state).Also known as the Peace
of Augsburg. A criticism that arises out of this Peace is that the Peace directed the different states to
recognize the religion of the prince of said state and that the religion of the prince would be the de facto
religion of his state.
80 Treaty of Westphalia, Article art. 28, Oct. 24, (1648), Richard Cavendish, The Treaty of Westphalia, HIsrORYTODAY, Oct. 1998. http://avalon.law.yale.eduI 7th-century/westphal.asp.

81 Id.
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ious minorities are to be protected by ensuring their right to exercise their
religion, their ability to congregate in the worship of their religion, and to engage
in rituals, as determined by their priests. Also, the Peace prescribes a very
straightforward, albeit implied, protection: protection of life and liberty, and protection from being molested for their beliefs.
Furthermore, the Peace of Westphalia created an obligation for signatories to
ensure that all of the articles are enforced and ensure these protections, so far as
Article 28 is concerned, for religious minorities in different States. It claims:
. . .the concluded Peace shall remain in force, and all Part[ies] in this
Transaction shall be oblig[ed] to defend and protect all and every Article
of this Peace against any one, without distinction of Religion; and if it
happens any point shall be violated, the Offended shall before all things
exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to
a friendly Composition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.8 2
The obligation, thus created for all signatories, is to "defend and protect all
and every Article," including Article 28.83 Thus, considering Articles 28, a reasonable interpretation holds that European States, following the Peace of Augsburg, understood that States had a duty to respect and allow individuals to
practice the religion of their choice. 8 4 But considering Article 28 within Article
123, this evidence supports the claim that States, through this treaty, created an
active obligation toward one another to ensure that no State, as a signatory State,
would be permitted to violate any of the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia,
including Article 28.85 Article 123 states "all parties . . . shall defend and protect
all and every Article . .. against any one, without distinction of Religion." 8 6 Even
more so, Article 28, in conjunction, creates an implied prohibition against States
being the instigators and perpetrators of atrocities against religious minorities,
both internally and externally. The Article intentionally states "against any one"
without providing any distinctions. The use of this phrase, as stated, evidences an
intention to have States hold one another accountable and to ensure that States
were not engaging in vast mistreatment of religious minorities.
Therefore, looking at the Peace of Westphalia, specifically Articles 28 and
123, conjunctively, the Peace provides strong evidence that the signatories intended to protect religious minorities, within and outside of their own territories,
from State-sanctioned mistreatment of these minorities. It supplemented the new
norm that that States were entrusted to protect not only its homogenous citizens,
but also people who held different religions, creeds, and ethnic backgrounds.
82 Id. at art. 123.
83 Id.
84 LUMENLEARNING, supra note 78.

85 Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, MICH., 25 Mich. J.
INT'L L. 981, 983 (2004). ("The sovereign State which it prescribed was Janus-faced, its government

staring both inward at its subjects, over which it had supreme authority, and outward beyond the state's
borders, where no rival authority was entitled to force a change in the governance of its inhabitants.).
86 Treaty of Westphalia, supra note 80.
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The Treaty of Kfigilk Kaynarca, 1774

v.

The Treaty of Kiiqik Kaynarca, signed in 1774, was one of the first instances
that, in application at least, a sovereign State was expressly prohibited from engaging in mistreatment of a religious minority within its own political borders by
another sovereign State. In this case, the Russian Empire, through the application
of the Treaty, placed severe limitation on the Ottomans and their treatment of
Orthodox Christians.8 7 Furthermore, the Russians, through the Treaty and their
interpretation of it, became the protectors of the Orthodox Christians and retained
a right to intervene in the affair of the Ottomans if there was a direct, negative
effect on that religious minority.8 8
The Treaty of Kii
9 6k Kaynarca ended the Russo-Turkish War, which was
fought between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire from 1768-74. The
War ended with the crushing defeat of the Ottomans at Kozludzha. As a result,
the Russians were able to force the Ottomans to acquiesce to any conditions they
placed on them; including the return of Wallachia and Moldovia to the Ottomans
for an even better concession from the Ottomans. Russia received the inalienable
right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire and the right to intervene if Christians were mistreated.
The first assertion of Russia's right to ensure the protection of Orthodox
Christians comes in Article 7 of the Treaty. The Treaty emphasizes:
The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion
and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of
Russia to make . . . representations . . ., as on behalf of its officiating
ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration,
as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly Power.8 9
In Article 7, the Russian Empire forced the Ottomans to capitulate to Statesanctioned protections of religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire, specifically
Christians. They forced the Ottomans to "promise to protect" Christians and their
churches. 90 This promise, more or less, was the Russian's attempt to ensure the
protection of the Orthodox Christians through proper legal protections that could
not, without Russian intervention, be easily countermanded by the Ottomans
92
oblilater.9 1 Furthermore, the Article, besides confirming the Sublime Porte's
gation, also indirectly proscribes the Ottoman Empire from engaging in any ac87

J. C. HuREwiz, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
936 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. Rev. vol. 1, 1979).
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88 PAUL W. SCHROEDER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS: 1763-1848 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1994).
89 Treaty of Kfligk Kaynarca, art. 7, ( Jul. 21, 1774), Great Britain, ParliamentaryPapers, 1854, vol.
72.7 (1774), http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/hist/eialdocuments archive/kucuk-kaynarca.php.

90 Id.

91 Schroeder, supra note 88, at 22.
92 Id. at 736 (defining Sublime Porte).The royal palace of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and the
seat of the Ottoman Government.
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tions contrary to the obligation created under Article 7. The obligation to protect
the Christian minority created a direct responsibility for the Ottomans to refrain
from engaging in activity that would be harmful to the religious minority. 9 3
Article 7 takes the protection of Christians a step further when it allows the
representatives of the "Imperial Court of Russia to . . . make representations ...
on behalf of the officiating ministers." 94 This means that the Russians gave themselves an active authority to be the representatives of the Orthodox faith, and not
just the representatives of the Russian Empire. Including this phraseology, within
Article 7, meant that the Russians, as they interpreted later, viewed this representative right as bestowing onto them the right to further intervene to promote the
protection of the Orthodox faith in the Ottoman Empire. 95
Furthermore, Article 8 has a similar effect as Article 7. However, Article 8
covers a new area of protection for the Christian minority that are temporarily
within the Ottoman Empire. The Russians assert:
The subjects of the Russian Empire, as well laymen as ecclesiastics, shall have
full liberty and permission to visit the holy city of Jerusalem, and other places
deserving of attention. No charatsch,9 6 contribution, duty, or other tax, shall be
exacted from those pilgrims and travelers by any one whomsoever, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, or on the road . . . During their sojourn in the Ottoman
Empire, they shall not suffer the least wrong or injury; but, on the contrary, shall
be under the strictest protection of the laws. 9 7
Through Article 8, the Russian Empire forces the Ottomans to provide legal
protection for Christians who are traveling in the Empire to visiting holy sites,
including Jerusalem. The Article goes further than specifying that the legal protections apply only to "the subjects of the Russian Empire;" it moves to include
non-subjects of the Russian Empire who are "laymen" acting as "ecclesiastics" in
that protection as well. 9 8 From the contexts of the article, it may be deduced that
the "laymen as ecclesiastics" would include the average practitioner of Christianity who engages in religious worship that is beyond the everyday worship, i.e.
going on a pilgrimage to holy sites. Asserting "During their sojourn in the Ottoman Empire, they shall not suffer the least wrong or injury; but, on the contrary,
shall be under the strictest protection of the law, "99 the article codifies Russia's
intent to force the Ottomans to create legal protections for Christians, including
the Christian citizens and non-citizens of Russia, in order to be in compliance
with the Treaty.
However, the first instances of an express right of protection and intervention
is noted in Article 14. Russia compels the Ottomans to:
93 Such actions are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs of this article.
94 Treaty of K6i5k Kaynarca, supra note 89.
95 Andre Gerolymatos, Turkish Straits: History, Politics and Strategic Dilemmas, The, 28 OCEAN
Y.B. Ir'L L. 58, 62 n. 15 (2014).
96 Treaty of Ki9ik Kaynarca, supra note 89 (defining charatsch as Haragor military-exemption tax).
97 Id. at art. 8.
98 Id.

99 Id. (emphasis added).
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After the manner of the other Powers, permission is given to the High Court of
Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the Minister's residence, to erect in one
of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the
Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the Ministers of that
Empire, and secure from all Coercion and outrage.lo"
This Article is the basis for Russia's later claims of protection of the Orthodox
faith within the Ottoman Empire.10 1 Article 14 requires the Ottomans to acknowledge the absolute authority of the Russian ministers', in the Empire, to
protect the "public church of Greek ritual." 0 2 This right is conferred to the "High
Court of Russia" and allows them to "secure" the protection of Orthodox Christians "from all Coercion and outrage." Through this, Russia, essentially, gave
itself the right to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire if the latter
engaged in activities that were a threat to the security of the Orthodox faith and
church, or engaged in any coercive or outrageous conduct that would be harmful
to the said community.
Furthermore, looking at this article in the context of the preceding articles,
precisely Articles 7 and 8, the right to protect Orthodox Christians seems to be
derived from here. Article 14, finally and expressly provides to the Russians the
right to intervene to protect Greek Orthodox churches in the Ottoman Empire.
After all, what is a church if it is not the people, their faith, their community, and
a shared sense of understanding and experiences? Though the right, as stated, is
to protect public churches of the Orthodox faith, construing this Article in the
context of the Articles 7 and 8, and reviewing Catherine the Great's understanding of the Treaty' 0 3 , Article 14, creates an overarching right to intervene in the
affairs of another sovereign State, the Ottomans, when it comes to protecting
members of the Orthodox Christian faith.
Articles 16 §2 and 17 §2 also created a right for the Russian Empire to intervene, based on the concept of pacta sundt servanda, when they declared that
Russia would return the land it had occupied during the Russo-Turkish War,
including all the territories in Bessarabia, the islands of the Archipelago, and the
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, but only when the Ottomans "solemnly
promis[ed] to keep" the following conditions "religiously":
. . . To obstruct in no manner whatsoever the free exercise of the Christian
religion, and to interpose no obstacle to the erection of new churches and to the
repairing of the old ones, as has been done heretofore . . .104
. .. That the Christian religion shall not be exposed to the least oppression any
more than its churches, and that no obstacle shall be opposed to the erection or

100 Id. at art. 14.
101 Schroeder, supra note 88.
102 Greek ritual refers to the Greek Orthodox Church, which may be interchangeable with the Orthodox Christian Faith.
103 The Cambridge History of Islam 815 (P.M. Holt et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 1977).
104 Treaty of Kiigfk Kaynarca, supra note 89, at art. 16, §2.
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repair of them; and also that the officiating ministers shall neither be oppressed
nor insulted.1 05
These two sections, collectively, state Russia's express intent to ensure the
protection of the Orthodox Christians in these territories of the Ottoman Empire.
They expressly enjoined the Ottomans from engaging in any activity that would
obstruct "the free exercise of the Christian religion," from creating "obstacles" to
the building of new churches or even fixing churches, and by requiring them to
refrain from oppressing or harming Orthodox Christian ministers. Articles 16 §2
and 17 §2 are express commands to the Ottomans that if they wanted the return
of their occupied territories, then the Ottomans could not engage in State-sanctioned mass oppression or harm of this religious minority in the Empire. If, in
fact, the Ottomans failed to abide by these sections, or intentionally violated
these sections, this would allow the Russian Empire to intervene to protect the
Orthodox Christians. 106
Lastly, Article 16 §9, claims that:
The Porte allows each of the Princes of these two States to have accredited to
it a Charg6 d'Affaires, selected from among the Christians of the Greek communion, who shall watch over the affairs of the said Principalities, be treated with
kindness by the Porte, and who, not withstanding their comparative want of importance, shall be considered as persons who enjoy the rights of nations, that is to
say, who are protected from every kind of violence.10 7
After the signing of the Treaty of Kiiptik Kaynarca, the Ottomans effectively
became the nominal government/administrators of Orthodox Christians. The Ottoman Empire's every step and action was watched by the Russian Empire because any infraction of the terms of the treaty would allow the Russians to
intervene to protect the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. All in all,
Articles 7, 14, 16 §2, 16 §9, and 17 §2 opened a door for foreign interference,
specifically from the Russian Empire, in the Ottoman Empire and how it dealt
with its own subjects.
As a consequence, Catherine, Empress of Russia, did in fact use these Articles,
as she interpreted them, to intervene in the Ottoman affairs relating to its subjects
and vassals. Russia used the treaty first to intervene in the Crimean Khaganate,
which had been granted independence in 1774 but nominally remained a vassal
of the Ottoman Empire. Russia sent troops to support the Khan of Crimea, who
established himself as a pro-non-Muslim khan supported by Christians in the
Crimea. As a result of this anti-Muslim stance, the Khan faced an uprising to
remove him from power.1 08 The Russians sent troops to protect the Christians
105

Id. at art. 17, §2.

106 Franz Thugut, the Austrian diplomat to the Ottoman Empire, noted that the treaty's clauses that
related to the Russian claims to intervene and protect the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire had
been "emblematic of the 'Russian skill' and 'Turkish imbecility."' CAROLINE FINKEL, OSMAN's DREAM:
THE STORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1300-1923, 379 (2007).
107 Treaty of Kiptik Kaynarca, supra note 89, at art. 16 §9.
108 FINKEL, supra note 106, at 380.
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who feared reprisal for their involvement.109 The Russian Empire, again, intervened in the Crimea in 1782, when the same Khan's brothers led a revolt. 11 0 This
right to intervene was also used by the Russians during the 1840s when Russia
used the pretext of protecting Orthodox Christians, both traveling and residing in
the Ottoman Empire, when it demanded that the Ottomans fully recognize "Russian pre-eminence in the Holy Sites and recognition of Russia's right over Ottoman Orthodox subjects." 1 Confronted by this ultimatum, the Ottoman Empire
declared war on Russia in July of 1877, and Russia responded by claiming their
right to intervene.
Thus, the Treaty of Kliqik Kaynarca was intended to protect the Orthodox
Christians traveling through and residing in the Ottoman Empire from State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or other forms of oppression. It further supplemented
a growing norm of protecting religious and ethnic minorities within a different
sovereign State by granting a right of intervention if a State failed to adhere to
the tenants of a treaty or their obligation to protect said minorities under the
treaty. Here, this meant that Russia, through the treaty, was given the power to
intervene if the Ottoman Empire failed to, de facto or de jure, protect Orthodox
Christians within its Empire.
vi.

The Treaty of Berlin, 1878

The Treaty of Berlin helped recognize the norm against State-sanctioned mass
murder, harm, or oppression when it conditioned the recognition of independent
sovereign States on the acceptance, by said States, of an incontrovertible prohibition against deadly, harmful, or oppressive actions against religious or ethnic
minorities. The Treaty of Berlin initially ended the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-8,
and included Great Britain, France (as the French Third Republic), Austria-Hungary, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, the Russian Empire, and the
Ottoman Empire as signatories to the treaty.
The Treaty continuously states, as a condition, the phrase:
... the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged
against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights . . . The freedom and
outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons
belonging to the . .. State, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall
be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. The subjects and

109 To the extent that they were actually involved, which is unknown.
110 FINKEL, supra note 10.6, at 380. However, this time, Catherine's forces did not leave the Crimea.
Instead, she swiftly moved to have the Crimea annexed into the Russian Empire.
111 Id. at 457.
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citizens of all the Powers, traders or others, shall be treated. . . without
distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality. 1 2
This phrasing is used a total of four times and is in reference to Roumania
(Romania), Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Servia (Serbia). The Treaty, and the high
contracting parties, attempted to ensure that the newly liberated States' 13 in the
Balkans would guarantee and promote the protection of religions and ethnic minorities that would be found in these territories. Articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 all
conditioned that if Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia wanted independence, and maintain it, then they would have to agree to refrain from discriminating, harming, or otherwise oppressing religious minorities. They were required to
accept their role in ensuring the "freedom and outward exercise of all forms of
worship" and that religious minorities would "be treated . .. without distinction
of creed, on a footing of perfect equality."I 14 The Treaty was intended to require
that the new States would not move to exclude, in any way, life threatening or
otherwise, minorities from being civilly and politically protected. Thus, the
Treaty solidified a special legal status for religious minorities. It stipulated that
the newly independent Balkan States had to recognize the non-Christians, including Jews and Muslims, as fully protected citizens. No action could be taken
against these citizens, either de facto or de jure, that threatened, harmed, or led to
the deaths of these religious minorities within Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania,
and Serbia.
The Treaty was also the attempt by high contracting parties' to ensure that
ethnic minorities would also be protected in Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and
Serbia. Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire demanded that "subjects and citizens of all the Powers" would be equally protected without any
distinction of their religious or ethnic background within these new States.1 15
In theory, the idea was that the contracting parties would enforce the articles
of the Treaty of Berlin on the newly recognized Balkan States. These Balkan
States were encouraged to abide by the terms of the treaty and ensure the protection of the religious and ethnic minorities within their territories. A violation of
these terms would then require some level of enforcement from the high contracting parties.
Thus, the Treaty of Berlin was intended, in part, to protect religious and ethnic
minorities in the newly recognized Balkans States after the Russo-Turkish War,

.

112 Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878 (hereinafter "Treaty of Berlin") art. 4, 27, 35,
and 44, AM. J. Iwr'iL L., Vol. 2, No. 4, 424, 419 (1908).
113 I have included Montenegro into this accounting even though, technically speaking, Montenegro
had been independent well before 1878. I include it here because as a result of the Treaty of Berlin,
Montenegro received two major concessions; these were: (1) Acknowledgement of its independence,
acknowledge by Turkey; and (2) territory.
114 Treaty of Berlin, supra note 112, at art. 20. (Similar phraseology was used in Article 20, relating to
the province of Eastern Roumelia. The Treaty, again, provided for the protection of religious and ethnic
minorities in this province by requiring the Ottomans to: undertake to enforce there the general laws of
the Empire on religious liberty in favor of all forms of worship . .
It5 Treaty of Berlin, supra note 112, at art. 8.
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1877-8. Articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 ensure that these Balkan States would protect
ethnic and religious minorities in their territories. Furthermore, the direct consequence of this protection was that these States, based on the doctrine of pacta
sundt servanda, could not engage in activities that would result in State-sanctioned murder, harm, or oppression of these minorities. The Treaty also supplemented the norm against such actions by created a condition precedent to
officially recognizing these Balkan States. These States had to agree to legally
protect ethnic and religious minorities before they would be officially
recognized.
vii.

Twentieth Century Examples

The historical precepts provided above are but the most apropos examples of
sovereign States actively engaging in instances to ensure the protection of minorities in their own political borders, and more importantly, in the borders of other
sovereign States. These precepts are foundational illustrations of the protection of
minorities levied against States; however, they are limited, in time frame, to instances dating before the twentieth century. There are numerous more examples
from the twentieth century that help develop a claim that preventing States from
engaging in mass, State-sponsored, murder or other harms has been a part of
customary international law. These examples range from The Little Treaty of
Versailles; the Austrian-Czech-Yugoslav Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye (1919);
the Romanian Treaty of Paris (1919), the Greek Treaty of S6vres (1920); the
Hungarian Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine
(1919), and the Turkish Treaty of Lausanne (1923).116
These treaties where drawn up after the conclusion of World War I when national political borders were redrawn without considering the different ethnicities
within each State. Redrawing these borders broke up ethnic groups and subjected
them to murder, harm, or oppression. This series of treaties, thus, functioned as a
barrier to States by ensuring the protection of ethnic and religious minorities in
these States.
As such, this set of treaties ensured the "protection of life and liberty" and the
free exercise of religion in the territories of all the contracting parties.1 1 7 These
treaties also required States to take steps to protect ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities by recognizing them as:
(a) equal in the eye of the law; (b) free use of the mother tongue . . . in regard
to religion, the press and publications, and also at public meetings and in the
courts of laws; (c) the right to establish at their own expense charitable, religious,
social or educational institutions; (d) in towns and districts, in which the minority
constitutes a considerable proportion of the population, instruction in the primary
schools . . . in the language of that minority . . .118
116 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki, 23 REV. OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIus 75, 75-92 (1997).
117 Helmer Rosting, Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 648
(1923).
118 Id. at 649.
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Furthermore, these treaties were intended to give the minority inhabitants of
the different contracting States protections regardless of their ethnicity, religion,
or language. They were meant to protect the minority from the majority, or the
State, engaging in State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression." 9 The
new States that emerged after World War I had to take steps to ensure that they
did not discriminate against minorities. 120 These new States had to accept these
conditions and incorporate them as "fundamental laws of State . . . over which no
other laws shall prevail" in order to be recognized, diplomatically, as independent, sovereign States. 12 1 As such, these successor States were unrecognized, or
they had not been "created" until their acquiescence to the treaties.1 2 2
The responsibility of ensuring compliance with this undeniable protection was
then given to the League of Nations. 1 2 3 The League was also tasked with determining the admission of new States into the League. However, the condition
precedent to admission was that new States needed to "take the necessary measures to enforce the principles of the minorities treaties." 1 2 4 Eventually, Finland,
after appending its constitution to include express protections for minorities, Albania, after ratifying a declaration similar to the Minority Treaties, and Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania signed on and were subsequently admitted. 12 5
The Minority Treaties brought international recognition to and created an international joint effort in protecting ethnic and religious minorities who had existed outside of the normal political membership and thus, outside of legal
protection. These treaties required additional guarantees from States that minorities would be protected from State-sanctioned mass murder, harm or oppression. 1 2 6 States were inexplicably aware, at this point, that religious and ethnic
minorities were to be protected inside and outside of a State's own borders. The
norm had developed, by this point, to ensure that States took no actions that
would be detrimental to the continued existence of minority communities. Even
more so, successors States, and to some degree, existing States, became aware
that their own existence was conditional upon the prohibition of State-sanctioned
mass murder, harm, or oppression of religious and ethnic minorities. Thus, the
Minority Treaties furthered the norm against such behavior by creating conditions upon recognition of independent States and by creating a widespread legal
obligation on States.

119 Id.
120 John Quigley, Russian Minorities in The Newly Independent States, 3 ILSA J. oF INT'L
L. 455, 456 (1997).
121

COMP.

Rosting, supra note 117, at 641, 649.

122 OSCAR 1. JANOWSKY,

THE JEws AND

MrNORITY RIGHTS

(1898-1919) 419, 342 (1933).

123

Rosting, supra note 117, at 649.

124

Id. (citing the report of the 25th Plenary Meeting of the First Assembly).
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Id. at 650-53.

126

Preece, supra note 116, at 75-92.
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B.

Opinio Juris

To form CL there must exist evidence of opinio juris sive necessitatas12 7 , or
just opinio juris, along with State Practice. Article 38 §1(b) requires not only

State practice, but practice that must also be "accepted as law."1 28 For example,
where the French government challenged, as a violation of international law, the
Turkish court's action in arresting, fining, and imprisoning a French sailor who
had caused the deaths of Turkish sailors, the Lotus Case court held that "States
had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not
that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it
be possible to speak of an international custom."1

29

Similarly, where Colombia

sought to transport an asylum seeker residing in the Colombian Embassy in Peru
to Colombia, the Asylum Case court held that the Colombian government failed
to show that States were obligated to grant safe passage to asylum seekers from
the embassy "as a duty incumbent on them and not merely for reasons of political
expediency." 130
Thus, opinio juris will only be satisfied if there exist acts that are "carried out
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."131 There exists a subjective
element where States act in accordance with the legal obligation because it feels
that it must conform to the proscribed behavior.'1 3 2
Furthermore, the concept or doctrine of pacta sundt servanda also affects
opinio juris. Pacta sundt servanda generally translates to "agreements must be

honored."1 33 However, the rule, as applied in international law, more so requires
that every treaty that is enforced is "binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."1 34 As such, pacta sundt servanda creates an
expectation among States that each party will actively upholds its obligations
under a treaty. 3 5 The Vienna Convention, asserts that these obligations must be
fulfilled in good faith, thus creating both a legal and moral obligation on the
parties.1 36 Furthermore, the Permanent Court of International Justice, when interpreting treaty clauses that prohibited States from engaging in State-sanctioned
discrimination against minorities, claimed that these clauses must be applied in a
127 Opinio juris sive necessitats means "an opinion of law or necessity," thus, opinio juris means
"opinion of law."
128 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6.
129 SS "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18, 28 (Sept. 7, 1927).
130 Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment,1950 1.C.J. Rep. 266, 15 (Nov. 20, 1950).
131 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.),, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 44 (Feb. 20, 1969).
132

Id.
A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICA92 (Mortimer N.S. Seller & Elizabeth Andersen, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
VCLT, supra note 35, at art. 2.1(a).

133 BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TIONS
134

135 MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
136 LEPARD,

107 (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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manner that evidenced the absence of discrimination de facto, not just de jure. 1 3 7
Thus, because a State must fulfill its obligations under treaties both in fact and in
law, a State must ensure that it does not engage in any action, de facto, that
would be counter to its obligation under a treaty.
All of this means that opinio juris implies a subjective obligation that a State is
bound to the law in question. The State's actions must be such that it arose out of
that State's belief in a sense of legal obligation, not out of habit or national selfinterest.1 3 8

This paper, in most part, discusses the existence of CIL and opinio juris
through analyzing treaties. According to the Vienna Convention, a treaty is "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law." 1 3 9 Treaties provide evidence of CIL in two ways. First, a
treaty is a codification of what States believe to be the norm, or an already existing legal obligation. 140 This existing legal obligation amounts to CIL and, thus,
the treaty may be binding on the signatories independently. 14 1 The second is by
helping create new CIL.142 States, generally, including non-parties, may come to
regard the provisions in a treaty as binding on all States as part of CIL. 143 Article
38 of the Vienna Convention, states "Nothing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law" 14 4 and the International Law Commission's comment,
from 1966, provided the Hague Convention as an example. 1 4 5 Even more so, the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case court determined that:
as a norm-creating provision, which has constituted the foundation of, or
...
has generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its origins,
has since passed into the general corpus of international law, as is now accepted
137 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Draft Articles of the Law of Treaties with Commentaries
Adopted by the InternationalLaw Commission at its Eighteenth Session, art. , Article 23, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/11/13Add.2, (19661971); see Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J., (Ser. A/B) No. 44, at 28 (Feb. 4)
("It should be remarked in this connection that the prohibition against discrimination, in order to be
effective, must ensure the absence of discrimination in fact as well as in law. A measure which in terms is
of general application, but in fact is directed against Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or
speech, constitutes a violation of the prohibition"); see also Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J., (Ser. A/B) No. 64, at 19 (Apr. 6) ("Equality in law precludes discrimination of any
kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result
which establishes an equilibrium between different situations. It is easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment, of the majority and of the minority, whose situation and requirements are different,
would result in inequality in fact; treatment of this description would run counter to the first sentence of
paragraph I of Article 5.").
138 VILLIGER, supra note 14, at 47-48.

139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, at art. 2.1(a).
140 LEPARD, supra note 133, at 30.
141 Id.,at 31.
142 Id.
143 Id.

144 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, at art. 38.
145 LEPARD, supra note 133, at 31.
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as such by the opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for countries
which have never, and do not, become parties ...146
Furthermore, treaties are an articulation of existing norms that are "better than
any other practice of States" and properly evidence, or satisfy, the opinio juris
requirement. 147 As such, any generalizable statements in treaties may be deemed
to be rules of law that have become customary.1 4 8 However, it is not just the
statements in treaties that evince opiniojuris; opinio juris may also be evidenced
through the existence of the treaty itself, as a bilateral or multilateral treaty. The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States asserts that a
"wide network of similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also result in customary law."1 4 9 The Continental Shelf Case (Libya v.
Malta) court even goes as far as promulgating that multilateral conventions are
important because they record and define rules that are derived from customs.150
After all, what is a treaty if not the act of expressing the views of States, governments, and anyone else who makes decisions regarding foreign affairs? Villiger
even claims that "written text may reflect, or provide evidence of the customary
rule."151 Thus, States' express statements, like treaties, regarding obligations
under law, may provide the "clearest evidence as to the State's legal
conviction."

1 52

Reviewing the above-mentioned treaties (the Edict of Nantes, the Peace of
Westphalia, the Treaty of Ktigiik Kaynarca, the Treaty of Berlin, and the Minority Treaties) within this scope, the signatories of the treaties had an intent to sign
and be bound to terms in the treaties. Regardless of the contexts in which signatories found themselves, when signing, the treaties are still binding upon the
signatories.
The Edict of Nantes was one of the first instances in which a State attempted
to limit its authority and ensure that France would not engage in conduct that
would be harmful to people residing in France. The Edict proscribed France's
behavior and that of other States; or to look at it another way, it created more
protections for its own people on the basis of their religion. France's intent is
obvious because France took the initial steps, without any involvement from external powers, to create this protection for Huguenots; it chose to provide more
protections at the cost of limiting its own interests. Furthermore, the Edict expressly spelled out how the Kingdom was limiting its own authority when it
146 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Ger. v. Den.; Ger v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ICJ 41, ¶71
(Feb. 20, 1969).
147 ANTHONY A. D'AMArO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 160-161 (NY: Cornell

University Press, 1971).
148 Id.; see also LEPARD, supra note 133, at 32 (citing Georg Schwarzenberger, InternationalLaw as
Applied by InternationalCourts and Tribunals: I, INT'L. JUDICIAL LAW, .422 (1957).
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102, cmt. i (AM.

LAW INsT.1986); see Ger. v. Den.; Ger v. Neth., 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at 28-29, 37-43.
150 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, 29-30,
(June 3, 1985).
151 Villiger, supra note 14.
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granted the Huguenots an international level of protection that had not been seen
before. The Edict asserted that "all [the king's] subjects, even for the said pretended Reformed religion . . . may not be forced to do anything against their
conscience, nor be subject to the Inquisition, going, coming, travelling and trading in foreign countries."1 5 3 This Edict gave France the authority to prohibit other
States from engaging in activities that would have been seen as detrimental to the
Huguenots and it gave the king an implied right to seek remedies against an
offending State. The fact that France issued the Edict to limits its own authority
by creating stronger protections, inside and outside of France, is evidence that is
contrary to its own interest. France would not have moved to protect Huguenots
if it did not believe that it had to conform to some obligation. Thus, this evidence
provides strong support to the fact that there had to have existed some norm that
would have prohibited State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of ethnic and religious minorities.
The Peace of Westphalia is another instance in which influential States convened to recognize and proscribe a state's behavior towards religious minorities
in Europe. The Peace ensured that people "shall have the free Exercise of their
Religion."1 54 It acknowledged that members of religious minorities were to be
protected by ensuring their right to exercise their religion, their ability to congregate in the worship of their religion, and to engage in rituals as determined by
their priests. The Peace also prescribes a very straightforward, albeit implied,
protection; the protection of life and liberty, and protection from being molested
for their beliefs. The Peace created the obligation for signatories is to ensure that
all of the articles of the treaty are enforced and ensure the protection, of religious
minorities in different States in Article 28. It requires "all Part[ies] . . . to defend
and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any one, without distinction of Religion." 55 Thus, under the Peace, European States had a duty to respect
and allow individuals to practice their religion of choice. 156 Also, the Peace created an active obligation towards each State to ensure that no State, as a signatory, would be permitted to violate any of the provisions of the Peace of
Westphalia, including Article 28.157 Article 28, in conjunction with Article 123,
creates an implied prohibition against States being the instigators and perpetrators of atrocities against religious minorities, both internally and externally.
Lastly, the Peace requires States to hold each other accountable for these proscribed behaviors.
The Treaty of Kdiitik Kaynarca, on the other hand, expressly prohibited a sovereign State from engaging in mistreatment of a religious minority within its own
political borders. In this case, the Russian Empire, through the application of the
153 Edict of Nantes art. 53, April 13, 1598, THE HuoUENOT SOCIETY OF AMERICA, TERCENTENARY
CELEBRATION OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES 103-104 (The Huguenot Society of

America, 1900).
154 Treaty of Westphalia, supra note 80, at art. 28.
155 Id. at art. 123.
156 Christenson, supra note .78, at 743-44.
157 Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 Mich. J. Int'l L.
981, 983 (2004), https://repository.law.umich.edulmjil/vol25/iss4/11.
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treaty, placed severe limitation on the Ottomans and their treatment of Orthodox
Christians.' 5 8 Interpretation of the treaty allowed the Russians to become the protectors of the Orthodox Christians with the right to intervene in the affair of the
Ottoman Empire if there was a direct, negative effect on that religious minority.1 5 9 The Treaty forced the Ottomans to make "promises to protect constantly
the Christian religion and its churches."1 60 This promise was the Russians' attempt to ensure the protection of the Orthodox Christians through proper legal
protection.1 6 1 Also, the Treaty indirectly proscribes the Ottoman Empire from
engaging in any actions contrary to its obligations created under Articles 7, 8, 14,
16 §2, and 17 §2. Article 14 required the Ottomans to acknowledge the absolute
authority of the Russian ministers to protect the "a public church of Greek ritual." 1 6 2 Russia, essentially, was given the right to intervene in the affairs of the
Ottoman Empire if the latter engaged in activities that were a threat to the security of the Orthodox faith and church. The right to intervene could also be used if
the Ottoman Empire engaged in any coercive or outrageous conduct that would
be harmful to the Orthodox community. Similarly, Articles 16 §2 and 17 §2
created a right for the Russian Empire to intervene, based on the concept of pacta
sundt servanda, when they declared that Russia would return the lands it had
occupied, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, but only when the Ottomans agreed to "the free exercise of the Christian religion, and to interpose no
63
obstacle to the erection of new churches and to the repairing of the old ones."1
Furthermore, the Ottomans had to agree that the "Christian religion shall not be
exposed to the least oppression any more than its churches."lM The Ottomans
understood that they were expressly enjoined from engaging in any activity that
would qualify as state-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of the Orthodox faith. Thus, the Treaty of Ktigtik Kaynarca further supplemented a growing
norm of protecting religious and ethnic minorities within a different sovereign
State by granting a right of intervention if a State failed to adhere to the tenetts of
a treaty or their obligation to protect said minorities under the treaty.
Another treaty that provides evidence of a developing norm on the prohibition
of State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression is the Treaty of Berlin. The
high contracting parties used the treaty to ensure the newly established States in
the Balkans would promote the protection of religions and ethnic minorities
found in these territories. Articles 5, 27, 35, and 44 all conditioned that if
Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia wanted independence, and wanted to
maintain it, they would have to agree to refrain from discriminating, harming, or
otherwise oppressing religious minorities. These States were required to protect
158
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the "freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship" and guarantee that
religious minorities would "be treated . . . without distinction of creed, on a
footing of perfect equality." 16 5 The Treaty was intended to require the new States
to protect minorities civilly and politically. Furthermore, the direct consequence
of this protection was that these States, based on the doctrine of pacta sundt
servanda, could not engage in any activity that would result in state-sanctioned
murder, harm, or oppression of these minorities. The Treaty also supplemented
the norm by creating a condition precedent to officially recognizing these Balkan
States. The Treaty helped signatories determine the existence and legitimacy of
States; meaning that an existing and legitimate State cannot, and should not, engage in State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of an ethnic or religious minority if it wanted to continue being recognized as an existing and
legitimate State.
The Minority Treaties are the culmination of all the preceding treaties. These
treaties were made up of six treatiesl 6 6 and were the direct result of the 1919
Paris Peace Conference. These treaties functioned as a barrier against State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of minorities by confirming the protection of ethnic and religious minorities in all States. The treaties were promulgated
to guarantee the "protection of life and liberty" and the free exercise of religion
in the territories of all the contracting parties.1 67 The treaties required States to
take steps to protect ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities by prescribing that
these people were to be viewed equally under the law and have the free exercise
of their religion, language, and culture in their homes and societies. 168 To be
recognized as independent, sovereign States the new States that emerged after
World War I had to take steps to ensure that they did not discriminate against
minorities. 169 Their independence was only recognized when they accepted the
conditions in the Minority Treaties and incorporated them as "fundamental laws
7 0 The Minority Treaties
of State . . . over which no other laws shall prevail."o
took it one step further than the other treaties mentioned above by creating a
system of compliance through the League of Nations.1 7 1 The League determined
membership based on whether the State seeking admittance complied with the
Minority Treaties and by investigating noncompliance regarding minority protections. The League absolutely needed to ensure that its States took "the necessary
165 Similar phraseology was used in Article 20, relating to the province of Eastern Roumelia. The
Treaty, again, provided for the protection of religious and ethnic minorities in this province by requiring
the Ottoman's to: undertake to enforce there the general laws of the Empire on religious liberty in favour
of all forms of worship. Treaty of Berlin, supra note 112, at art. 20.
166 The Little Treaty of Versailles; the Austrian-Czech-Yugoslav Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye
(1919); the Romanian Treaty of Paris (1919), the Greek Treaty of S6vres (1920); the Hungarian Treaty of
Trianon (1920), the Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (1919), and the Turkish Treaty of Lausanne
(1923).
167 Rosting, supra note 117, at 648.
168 Id. at 649.

169 Quigley, supra note 120, at 456-57.
170 Rosting, supra note 117, at 649.
171 Id.
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measures to enforce the principles of the minorities treaties."1 7 2 The Minority
Treaties brought international recognition to the problems faced by ethnic and
religious minorities. 173 States knew, or should have known, at this point, that
religious and ethnic minorities were to be protected inside and outside of a
State's own borders. The norm had developed, by then, to prevent States taking
actions against minorities that would be detrimental to the continued existence of
those communities; and a norm where international bodies would hold violating
nations accountable. Thus, the Minority Treaties furthered the norm by proscribing actions that resulted in State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of
religious and ethnic minorities. It did so by creating conditions upon recognition
of independent States and by creating a widespread legal obligation on all States.
Furthermore, it is also important to note how this norm was promulgated in its
development by the Concordat of Worms and the trial of Peter von Hagenbach.
The Concordat was one of the earliest examples where a State exerted influence
and power within the territories of another sovereign State. Through the Concordat, the Pope was able to exert political influence over the actions of the Empire.
This power to exert influence was later implemented in attempting to protect
minorities in the political borders of other sovereign States.
Similarly, the trial of Peter von Hagenbach helped develop this norm by creating an international level of recognition that some actions are so egregious as to
warrant international intervention from other States. The Trial consisted of about
28 different principalities within the Holy Roman Empire who all came together
because they understood that rape was a crime that could not be tolerated in any
forum. The judges found von Hagenbach guilty because they understood that
certain actions should be prohibited, like rape, because they are more of a detriment to society than they can ever be useful. Thus, the Trial of Peter von
Hagenbach and the Concordat of Worms helped develop the norm against Statesanctioned mass murder, harm, or oppression of religious and ethnic minorities
by recognizing that certain actions must be prevented, and that States may intervene in the affairs of other sovereign States to ensure compliance with minority
protections.
IH.

Conclusion

Looking at the treaties and the trial above, there is ample evidence that supports the formation of a norm against State-sanctioned mass murder, harm, or
oppression of ethnic and religious minorities and the authority of other States to
intervene or prohibit such actions against said minorities. That being said, the
question of when the norm was actually established, and more precisely realized,
still remains uncertain. No consensus exists as to when or what date the norm
became a prominent, intertwined part of international law. At the very least, it is
evident that a norm did not already exist at the time of the Concordat of Worms,
the trial of Peter von Hagenbach, or even the Edict of Nantes. Conversely, the
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closest estimation that can be given, especially in this paper, is that this norm
became an unequivocal and pervasive part of international law somewhere between the Treaty of K6iuk Kaynarca, signed in 1774, and the Treaty of Berlin,
signed in 1878.
As stated above, for there to exist a customary international norm against mass
murder, harm, or oppression, there has to exist evidence of: (1) State practice;
and (2) opinio juris.17 4 The Edict of Nantes, the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty
Kaynarca, the Treaty of Berlin, and the Minority Treaties evidenced
of Kiik
State practice. These treaties are the clearest form of evidence that exist, and they
expressly represent the intent and understanding of each State involved in the
treaty. The treaties, however, go one step further by showing observers, more
accurately, other States, that from the contracting parties' stance there is a norm
that prohibits and proscribed State behavior to ensure that States act in accordance with specific treaty terms, and do not engage in actions contrary to a
treaty's purpose. These instances show a consistent statement of a norm through
a wide period of time, from 1474 to 1923.
However, for all of the evidence that this paper has supposed, it also raises one
concern: that there is a lack of evidence from a broad array of legal and political
systems. The treaties and trial stated above are predominantly from the European
theatre or involve European affairs. This paper has not provided evidence from
the Americas, Africa, or Asia because sources from these areas are scarce or have
been co-opted by European Jurisprudence as a result of European Imperialism.
More precisely, it shows that there may not be enough evidence of a consistent,
widespread, or systematic norm, prohibiting and proscribing State-sanctioned
mass murder, harm, or oppression of ethnic and religious minorities, to amount to
evidence of State practice for a global norm. The evidence supports the existence
of this norm as more of a regional custom. 7 5
Regardless, given the abundance of evidence already provided, a strong claim
for the existence of this norm, as a global norm, does in fact exist. Because there
are no set criteria to determine when a norm is consistent, widespread, or systematic enough, the evidence provided may be enough to support this norm.17 6 These
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6.
"Commentators have long asserted that a custom can, in principle, be restricted to a geographically
linked group of countries. Such a rule would bind only the states in that area, leaving nations elsewhere
unaffected." Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument
Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 572 (2016), citing Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 20); see also Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
supra note 7, at §102, cmt. e (1987) ("The practice of states in a regional or other special grouping may
create "regional," "special," or "particular" customary law for those states inter se. It must be shown that
the state alleged to be bound has accepted or acquiesced in the custom as a matter of legal obligation,
'not merely for reasons of political expediency.' Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), (1950) I.C.J. Rep. 266,
277. Such special customary law may be seen as essentially the result of tacit agreement among the
parties.")
176 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra note 7, §102, cmt. b (1987)
("The practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively short duration, but under
Subsection (2) it must be 'general and consistent.' A practice can be general even if it is not universally
followed; there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should reflect
wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.")
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treaties and trial span five-hundred and forty-nine years, and a multitude of ethnic backgrounds and religions. This evidence may be enough to prove the norm
in the context of the norm itself. The norm concerns religious minorities; these
treaties cover Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Muslims. It covers
two of the largest and geographically widespread religions of the world, Islam
and Christianity. The norm also concerns a wide array of ethnic minorities; these
treaties cover Huguenots, French, Turks, Russians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Austrians, Germans, Hungarians, Brits, Armenians, Poles, Serbs, Greeks, Bosniaks
and many more ethnic groups.1 77 In this context, the norm may have been consistent, widespread, and systematic enough to be evidence of State practice.
The existence of a consistent, widespread, and systematic State practice is also
evidence of opinio juris.17 8 Because contracting states moved to include language
and clauses in these treaties to protect ethnic and religious minorities, and prohibit states from attempting to harm them in any form, this shows that there was
an awareness from States that there may exist a norm that required the protection
of minorities. The treaties are evidence that States believed that a norm existed
and, as such, required them to comply. The treaties attempt to proscribe State
behavior, even if the proscription may only be implied at best. States complied
with the norm because of what they may have believed was already required of
them. The fact that these treaties take bold stances to ensure the equal, fair, and
just treatment supports the existence of a norm that would prohibit States from
engaging in any actions that would be contrary to ensuring equality, fairness, and
justice.

177 See Edict of Nantes, art. 52; Treaty of Westphalia, art. 28 & 123; Treaty of Kiigik Kaynarca, art.
7, 14, 16 §2, 16 §9, and 17 §2; The Treaty of Berlin, art. 5, 27, 35, and 44; see also the Minority Treaties
(The Little Treaty of Versailles; the Austrian-Czech-Yugoslav Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye (1919); the
Romanian Treaty of Paris (1919), the Greek Treaty of S~vres (1920); the Hungarian Treaty of Trianon
(1920), the Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (1919), and the Turkish Treaty of Lausanne (1923)).
178 See Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law 21 (2016) ("The very process of treaty negotiation and drafting may allow States to clarify an unclear or disputed customary rule by reaching agreement on what the rule is. After all, the process of treaty negotiation is an action of State practice, and in
the course of debates many statements of opinio juris might be made. This process could 'crystallize' the
emergency of a customary rule. . .Put simply, if enough States agree in a given forum that a rule is part of
a custom, then it very likely is a part of custom.")
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